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FACEBOOK OR FACE BANK? 
Carmen Aguado* 
 
On June 7, 2011, social media giant Facebook Inc. debuted its facial 
recognition tool to all of its users.  The facial recognition tool has the capa-
bility of identifying individuals automatically in photographs uploaded to 
Facebook by its users. Soon thereafter, the facial recognition tool prompted 
privacy concerns and ultimately led to a complaint being filed with the 
Federal Trade Commission. While at first denying its use of facial recogni-
tion technology, Facebook eventually admitted to its use of the technology.  
However, Facebook failed to acknowledge that it collected and stored the 
biometric data—data that is considered highly sensitive—of all of its users 
without their consent.  Accordingly, Facebook violated the privacy rights 
of its users when it covertly collected and stored the data.  Although it may 
be possible for users to bring a private action against Facebook for privacy 
violations, they would, nevertheless, be confronted with a tremendous 
roadblock—the issue of standing.  Without the ability to legally protect 
their data, Facebook users are left with little recourse. Accordingly, the 
United States Government and courts must heighten privacy protections of 
personalized information, such as biometric data, to prevent companies like 
Facebook from usurping highly sensitive personalized data of their users. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early June of 2011, Facebook unveiled a new feature called “tag 
suggestions” to all of its users.1  Tag suggestions activate when a user up-
loads a picture to his or her Facebook page.2  Immediately, Facebook’s fa-
cial recognition software identifies the people in the photographs.3  Face-
book states that the facial recognition tool “speed[s] up the process of 
identifying and labeling people in photos.”4  However, the strength of 
Facebook’s facial recognition technology relies on the depth of its facial 
recognition database.5  The database is comprised of Facebook users that 
have previously been tagged in photographs, many of whom were unaware 
that Facebook was storing their unique facial features.6  This process may 
sound harmless at first—Facebook is simply making it easier to tag pic-
tures.  However, when users learn how facial recognition technology 
works, the “convenience” of this technology may make many feel uneasy 
because it arguably constitutes an invasion of privacy. 
                                                            
1.  See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, FACEBOOK BLOG (June 30, 2011, 
5:16 PM), https://www.facebook.com/blog.php?post=467145887130 [hereinafter Mitchell I]. 
2.  See Justin Mitchell, Making Photo Tagging Easier, FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.facebook.com/blog/blog.php?post=467145887130 [hereinafter Mitchell II] (“When 
[users] upload new photos, [Facebook] use[s] face recognition software . . . to match . . . new 
photos to other photos you’re tagged in.  [Facebook] group[s] similar photos together and, when-
ever possible, suggest[s] the name of the friend in the photos.”); see also Sarah Jacobsson Purew-
al, Why Facebook’s Facial Recognition is Creepy, PCWORLD (June 8, 2011), http://www. 
pcworld.com/article/229742/why_facebooks_facial_recognition_is_creepy.html (“Basically, 
Facebook is using facial recognition technology to ‘suggest’ tags to users who upload photos.”).  
3.  See Mitchell II, supra note 2 (“When [users] upload new photos, [Facebook] use[s] 
face recognition software . . . to match [] new photos to other photos you’re tagged in.  [Face-
book] group[s] similar photos together and, whenever possible, suggest[s] the name of the friend 
in the photos.”). 
4.  See Alexei Oreskovic & Georgina Prodhan, Facebook Gives Regulators Info on Facial 
Recognition, REUTERS (June 8, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/08/facebook-
idUSN0826171920110608.  
5.  See Declan McCullagh, Face-matching with Facebook Profiles:  How It Was Done, 
CNET NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20088456-281/face-matching-
with-facebook-profiles-how-it-was-done/#ixzz1n3uRVy17 (stating that Facebook has a  “vast 
database” of “wide-open profile photos”); see also Purewal, supra note 2 (explaining that Face-
book’s facial recognition technology “learns” more about a what a person looks each time they 
are identified in a photo and, further, that the information is stored in a facial recognition data-
base).  See generally General Info, FACE RECOGNITION HOMEPAGE, http://www.face-rec.org/ 
general-info/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (explaining that facial recognition works by comparing a 
still image to a stored database of faces). 
6.  See Mark Milian, Facebook Lets Users Opt Out of Facial Recognition, CNN TECH 
(June 7, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-07/tech/facebook.facial.recognition_1_facebook-
ceo-mark-zuckerberg-facial-recognition-face-recognition?_s=PM.  
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This invasion of privacy has unnerved many in the industry.7  Eric 
Schmidt, former Google CEO, saw no privacy concern in 2010 when he 
said, “[Google doesn’t] need you to type at all.  We know where you are.  
We know where you’ve been.  We can more or less know what you’re 
thinking about.”8  Schmidt, however, does find facial recognition tech-
nology to be problematic.9  He stated that Google would not use facial 
recognition technology because its accuracy was “very concerning” and it 
was “too creepy.”10 
Schmidt’s concerns are not without merit.  The ways in which the in-
formation generated by the technology can be used makes the facial recog-
nition software bothersome.  For example, someone could casually snap a 
photo of an unsuspecting stranger and then match that stranger to his or her 
online identity within minutes using a computer application that integrates 
facial recognition technology with data accessible on the Internet.11  Face-
book’s user profile pictures,12 which are now public by default,13 and other 
accessible data on Facebook, could facilitate this process.14  With the imag-
es that are available online, including every Facebook user’s profile pic-
ture, technologically savvy individuals can potentially match a face with a 
                                                            
7.  See, e.g., Daily Mail Reporter, “Too Creepy Even for Google”:  Search Engine Boss 
Warns Government Against Facial Recognition Technology, MAIL ONLINE (May 20, 2011), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1388855/Google-CEO-Eric-Schmidt-warns-go 
vernments-facial-recognition-technology.html#ixzz1bYgc8E6f (explaining that Schmidt believes 
the use of facial recognition technology by organizations crosses the proverbial line and can 
amount to an invasion of privacy). 
8.  Derek Thompson, Google’s CEO:  “The Laws Are Written by Lobbyists”, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/googles-ceo-the-laws-are-
written-by-lobbyists/63908/. 
9.  See Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 7 (explaining that Schmidt believes the use of fa-
cial recognition technology by organizations crosses the proverbial line and can amount to an in-
vasion of privacy). 
10.  See id. 
11.  See Jared Keller, Cloud-Powered Facial Recognition Is Terrifying, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
29, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/cloud-powered-facial-
recognition-is-terrifying/245867/ (“With Carnegie Mellon’s cloud-centric new mobile app, the 
process of matching a casual snapshot with a person’s online identity takes less than a minute.”). 
12.  Profile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/profile/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2012) (“Your [Facebook] profile begins with a quick summary of who you are, giving friends an 
easy way to see where you live now, where you’re working and more.”); see also Data Use Poli-
cy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (stat-
ing that a profile picture is to “help[] your friends and family recognize you” and is always pub-
licly available). 
13.  See Basic Privacy Controls, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page= 
132569486817869 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining your Facebook profile picture is made 
visible to everyone, including individuals not on Facebook). 
14.  See Keller, supra note 11. 
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Social Security number.15  Three days after Facebook launched tag sugges-
tions, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed a Com-
plaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief (“EPIC 
Complaint”) with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), urging the FTC 
to investigate Facebook’s new automated tagging feature.16  The complaint 
alleges, inter alia, that:  (1) Facebook is involved in “unfair and deceptive 
acts and practices” by its continued use of the automatic tagging feature; 
(2) Facebook’s implementation of the facial recognition technology is an 
invasion of privacy, which not only causes harm to consumers, but is done 
without their consent; and (3) Facebook’s collection of biometric data from 
children is contrary to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1988.17  Additionally, the EPIC complaint requests that the FTC require 
Facebook to: 
1. Immediately suspend Facebook-initiated tagging or 
identification of users based on Facebook’s database of 
facial images; 
2. Not misrepresent how it “maintains and protects the se-
curity, privacy, confidentiality, and integrity of any con-
sumer information”; 
3. Provide additional disclosures to users prior to new or 
additional sharing of information with third parties; and 
4. Establish, implement, and maintain a comprehensive 
privacy program.18 
The EPIC Complaint focuses on Facebook’s business practices19 be-
cause the FTC is equipped to pursue such violations under section 5(a) of 
                                                            
15.  See id.; see also More than Facial Recognition, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., 
http://www.cmu.edu/homepage/society/2011/summer/facial-recognition.shtml (last visited Apr. 
15, 2012) (explaining how researchers were able to use facial recognition technology to predict 
personal interest and in a few instances Social Security numbers). 
16.  See Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief, In re Face-
book, Inc. and the Facial Identification of Users (2011) (on file with FTC), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/EPIC_FB_FR_FTC_Complaint_06_10_11.pdf. 
17.  See generally id. 
18.  Id. at 24, 33–34.  
19.  The FTC settled the complaint with Facebook in November of 2011.  See Press Re-
lease, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Priva-
cy Promises (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm.  
However, the November 2011 settlement between the FTC and Facebook does not mention the 
facial recognition tool or Facebook’s acquisition of biometric data.  See Agreement Containing 
Consent Order, In re Facebook, Inc. (No. 092-3183), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/ 
0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf.  The settlement does not apply retroactively, thus the data 
that has already been obtained without consent can remain in Facebook’s database.  See id.  How-
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the FTC Act.20  However, a private party should also be able to file a com-
plaint against Facebook for constitutional privacy violations and privacy 
tort violations. 
This Comment will explain the sensitive nature of biometric data and 
the reasons that it should be awarded greater legal protections.  Part II of 
this Comment will (1) provide a brief overview of the history of facial 
recognition technology, (2) describe the sequence of events leading to 
Facebook’s implementation of its facial recognition technology, and 
(3) address reasons why Facebook users should be concerned about this 
new technology.  Part III explains the violations Facebook has committed 
in illegally obtaining its users’ biometric data.21  Part IV will discuss the 
two primary issues that a private party might face when filing a suit, not-
withstanding the applicability of various privacy laws.  Finally, Part V of 
this Comment will provide suggestions on steps that the United States 
Government and courts should take to ensure that private information, such 
as biometrics, receives greater protections. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF BIOMETRIC DATA 
Biometric data use has grown substantially since the 1960s.22  In the 
1960s, facial recognition technology became semi-automated, whereby a 
                                                            
ever, the settlement requires Facebook to create a “comprehensive privacy program” that is de-
signed to address privacy risks related to the facial recognition tool.  See id. at 5 (“It is further 
ordered that Respondent shall . . . establish . . . a comprehensive privacy program . . . to (1) ad-
dress privacy risks related to the development and management of new and existing products and 
services for consumers.”  (emphasis added)).  The privacy program is to be designed by Facebook 
employees and gives the employees the responsibility of identifying the issues.  See id.  Thus, the 
great responsibility of rectifying the privacy issues related to Facebook’s taking of biometric data 
falls on the shoulders of Facebook. 
20.  See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law En-
forcement Authority, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(“The basic consumer protection statute enforced by the [FTC] is Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 
which provides that ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . are . . . 
declared unlawful.’” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). 
21.  The violations discussed in Part III are not exclusive.  For example, Facebook could 
also be found in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which protects individ-
uals from interception and monitoring of their electronic communications.  See generally Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2011).  Because e-mail and data 
stored electronically are covered by this definition, monitoring of such communications is gener-
ally prohibited.  Id.  Facebook violates the Act because it has intentionally intercepted electronic 
data by taking their users’ biometric data from photographs without consent.   
22.  See generally NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, Biometrics History, BIOMETRICS.GOV, 
8, 13 (2006), http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/biohistory.pdf (explaining that in the 1960s 
facial recognition was semi-automated, whereas, by the 1990s, the technology advanced to be-
come fully-automated). 
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system administrator had to locate key features in the photographs.23  Once 
the key features were manually identified, the system would calculate the 
distances from the key facial features and automatically compare the image 
to the reference data.24  Law enforcement agencies began to use the semi-
automated technology by the 1980s.25  This was illustrated in 1988, when 
the Lakewood Division of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 
used images of suspects captured in surveillance tapes and compared those 
images against its database of mug shots to find matches.26  Semi-
automated facial recognition was only the beginning of facial recognition 
technology.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, facial recognition technol-
ogy became fully-automated with “eigenface technology,” which allowed 
for real-time face recognition.27  Simply stated, with fully-automated real-
time facial recognition, an image of one’s face can be automatically recog-
nized and matched to other images in a database, without a system adminis-
trator manually locating the key features.28 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, the 
federal government paid “significantly enhanced attention” to biometric 
technologies.29  By 2009, there were more than thirty publicly available da-
tabases for facial recognition analysis.30  Today, applications such as 
Google’s Picasa, Apple iPhoto, Sony’s Picture Motion Browser, Windows 
Live Photo Gallery, and Facebook, all use facial recognition technology.31  
However, Facebook, unlike the other companies, impinged on the privacy 
rights of its users by covertly accumulating its robust database of biometric 
data.32  The potentially exploitative nature of personal biometric data sug-
gests that keeping this information private is extremely important. 
                                                            
23.  Id. at 8. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See id. at 13 (stating the Lakewood Division of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s De-
partment began using a semi-automated facial recognition system). 
26.  Id. at 13. 
27.  Id.  
28.  See Matthew A. Turk & Alex P. Pentland, Face Recognition Using Eigenfaces, 
BLAVATNIK SCH. COMPUTER SCI. – TEL AVIV UNIV., http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~shekler/ 
Seminar2007a/PCA%20and%20Eigenfaces/eigenfaces_cvpr.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).  
29.  See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, BIOMETRICS in Government POST-9/11:  Ad-
vancing Science, Enhancing Operation, OFF. SCI. & TECH. POL’Y 13 (2008), available at http:// 
www.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%209-11.pdf. 
30.  See id. 
31.  See Emily Shultz, Comment to Activate Face Recognition Log On in Laptop, 
TECHYV.COM (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.techyv.com/questions/activate-face-recognition-log-
laptop. 
32.  See Tharun Venkatesan, Google Plus Facial Recognition:  Find My Face, 
TECHNOSTREAK.COM (Dec. 10, 2011), http://technostreak.com/web/social/google-plus/google-
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A.  A Glimpse into Facial Recognition Technology and Its Significance 
Biometric data consists of “measurable . . . distinctive physical char-
acteristic[s] or personal trait[s] that can be used to identify an individual.”33  
For example, facial recognition software initially locates distinctive fea-
tures on the face and the measurements of the facial features, such as the 
distance between eyes or width of nose.34  These measurements are com-
piled to create an algorithm or biometric template of a person’s face.35  Fa-
cial recognition software then stores the template of the facial image in a 
database and compares the template to other stored images.36  Advance-
ments in facial recognition technology have allowed for individuals and 
private companies like Facebook to scan an image of a face and correlate 
the image to a Facebook user’s profile.37 
The biometric data fueling facial recognition technology is highly 
personal, individualized information, such that the data could eventually be 
used to link a stranger on the street to his or her credit score.38  It employs 
unique identifiers such as fingerprints.39  Because of the importance and 
private nature of this data and the accelerated advancements in biometric 
technology, the National Science and Technology Council (“NSTC”), a 
Cabinet-level Council,40 established a subcommittee to specifically re-
                                                            
plus-facial-recognition-find-my-face/ (explaining that Google Plus also uses facial recognition 
technology, but unlike Facebook, Google Plus allows users to opt in or out). 
33.  John D. Woodward, Jr., Christopher Horn, Julius Gatune & Aryn Thomas, Biomet-
rics:  A Look at Facial Recognition, RAND, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/DB396.pdf. 
34. See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Does Facial Recognition Work?, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Jul. 25, 2011), http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-
recognition1.htm/. 
35.  See Bryan Gardiner, Engineers Test Highly Accurate Face Recognition, WIRED (Mar. 
24, 2008), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2008/03/new_face_recognition. 
36.  See id. 
37.  See McCullagh, supra note 5.  
38.  See generally NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, Biometrics Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, BIOMETRICS.GOV, 21 (2006), http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/FAQ.pdf; see also 
Natasha Singer, Face Recognition Makes the Leap From Sci-Fi, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/business/face-recognition-moves-from-sci-fi-to-social-me 
dia.html (quoting researchers explaining how facial recognition software can be used by market-
ers to infer personal information about random individuals on the street).   
39.  See For Unique ID, Photo No Alternative to Fingerprint, DECCAN HERALD (Jan. 25), 
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/48769/for-unique-id-photo-no.html (explaining that al-
though fingerprints were found more accurate than facial recognition technology, at that time, 
both use biometric data that is personalized). 
40.  See About NSTC, OFFICE SCI. & TECH. POL’Y, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
administration/eop/ostp/nstc/about (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
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search biometric technology in 2003.41  While the NSTC primarily serves 
as a medium for government agencies and the public to access information 
concerning the Government’s use of technology in general,42 the subcom-
mittee on Biometrics and Identity Management (“BIM”) assists in coordi-
nating development in federal biometrics.43 
By 2006, recognizing the public concern surrounding biometrics, the 
sensitivity of the information obtained, and highly personal nature of the 
data collected, BIM urged companies to use privacy assessments whenever 
the use of biometric information is employed.44  BIM’s concern in protect-
ing the data stems from the ability of biometrics to detect human emo-
tions45 and its potential to identify an individual’s ethnicity—information 
that is generally regarded as private.46  Accordingly, the U.S. government 
considers biometric data to be “sensitive personal information”47 and be-
lieves that standards and regulations should be followed in any implemen-
tation of technology that uses biometric data.48 
Appreciating the sensitive nature of biometrics, the U.S. government 
classifies biometric data as Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”).49  
PII is any information that can be used to trace an individual’s identity,50 
                                                            
41.  See NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management Room, 
BIOMETRICS.GOV, http://www.biometrics.gov/nstc/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
42.  See About NSTC, supra note 40. 
43.  See NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management Room, supra note 
41 (explaining the purpose and objectives of BIM). 
44.  See PETER E. SAND ET AL., NSTC SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, PRIVACY & BIOMET-
RICS:  BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 35 (2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/ 
docs/privacy.pdf (explaining how the Government should apply privacy to biometric technology). 
45.  See Daniel Shemesh, Face Recognition Software Could Detect Pain in Patients, PIPE 
DREAM (May 6, 2011), http://www2.bupipedream.com/news/face-recognition-software-could-
detect-pain-in-patients-1.2223624#.Tp6PSt5 (noting that facial recognition technology can poten-
tially detect pain in patients); see also Omri Ceren, Creepy Airport Facial Recognition Automati-
cally Detects Lying, JAUNTED (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.jaunted.com/story/2011/9/7/ 
134855/2920/travel/creepy+airport+facial+recognition+automatically+detects+lying (noting fa-
cial recognition in airports can detect lying).  
46.  See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 4. 
47.  Id. at 21 (emphasis added).  
48.  Id. at 14. 
49.  See Biometrics & Personally Identifiable Information:  Assessing the Impact of U.S. 
Policy and Laws on the Use of Biometrics by Government Agencies and Evaluating Solutions to 
Meet Government Operational Requirements, NAT’L BIOMETRIC SECURITY PROJECT, 9, 13 
(2010), available at http://www.nationalbiometric.org/downloads/biometrics-and-privacy-report-
final-2011-02-22.pdf (defining biometrics as personally identifiable information and discussing 
the privacy issues that arise from biometrics being classified as PII). 
50.  Protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), NARA 1608, 3 (Aug. 6, 
2009), http://www.archives.gov/foia/directives/nara1608.pdf. 
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and, often, Congress enacts legislation to protect PII.51  For example, in 
2006, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. section 1028, which criminalizes the use 
of identification documents to steal one’s identity.52  The statute gives bio-
metric data, the information used in facial recognition technology, the same 
weight as a Social Security number, a government-issued driver’s license, 
or an identification number.53  However, despite the recognition that bio-
metric data is as personal and as important to protect as Social Security 
numbers, it has yet to receive the same level of attention from legislators 
and protection on the Internet.54 
Because biometric data is sensitive and is classified as PII,55 Face-
book should have given its users’ privacy greater deference prior to collect-
ing their biometric data.  Due to this lack of attention and its surreptitious 
collection of the data, Facebook is in violation of several privacy laws. 
B.  A Snapshot of Facebook’s Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
Facebook has become the largest social networking website, boasting 
approximately 800 million users worldwide.56  It is the second most-
trafficked site57 in the world and brands itself as a company that “facili-
tate[s] the sharing of information through the social graph.”58  Over 400 mil-
                                                            
51.  Peter Gray, Protecting Privacy and Security of Personal Information in the Global Elec-
tronic Marketplace, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/ico2.htm (explaining how 
Congressmen have proposed online privacy bills to protect personally identifiable information). 
52.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1)–(8) (2006). 
53.  See id. § 1028(d)(7)(A)–(D) (listing biometric data as a means of identification in 
conjunction with name and Social Security number).  
54.  The need to protect Social Security numbers has generated widespread attention from 
government agencies.  See Soc. Sec. Admin., Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, SSA 
Pub. No. 05-10064 (2009), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/10064.html (providing information on 
the importance of protecting your Social Security number and how to prevent identity theft); see 
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.85(a)(3)–(4) (prohibiting businesses and non-government entities 
from displaying Social Security numbers over the Internet, unless the connection is secure); 
S. 1691, 110th Cong. §§ 1–3 (2007) (proposing the restriction of the use and display of Social Se-
curity numbers to prevent identity theft and fraud.  The proposed bill has been reintroduced several 
times, but has not yet passed).  The actions taken to protect Social Security numbers, at the state 
and federal level, as described, display the government’s support in protecting Social Security 
numbers and further, its acknowledged importance of the information.  
55.  See Biometrics & Personally Identifiable Information:  Assessing the Impact of U.S. 
Policy and Laws on the Use of Biometrics by Government Agencies and Evaluating Solutions to 
Meet Government Operational Requirements, supra note 49 (explaining that biometric informa-
tion is PII).  
56.  See Newsroom, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx? 
NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
57.  Top Sites, ALEXA.COM, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
58.  Peering, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/peering/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
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lion of Facebook’s users log in to their Facebook accounts daily,59 250 mil-
lion photos are uploaded onto Facebook every twenty-four hours,60 and 
more than 7 million applications and websites are integrated with Face-
book.61  Facebook’s privacy policy,62 monitored by TRUSTe,63 assures the 
information that users share through their Facebook profile is safeguarded.64 
Facebook’s privacy policy is broken into several categories.65  It co-
vers the type of information Facebook receives about users, the information 
that can be accessed by users with their username or user identification, the 
information made public (that which can be viewed by anyone, including 
people who are not on Facebook), and the way that Facebook uses the in-
formation it collects.66  Facebook’s privacy policy states that Facebook re-
ceives and stores metadata from a user’s computer, such as the time, place, 
and date of photo uploads.67  However, the policy fails to mention that us-
ers’ biometric data is stored as well.68 
Facebook’s The Facebook Blog chronicled Facebook’s increasingly 
advanced use of facial recognition technology.69  The first mention of the 
enhanced tagging features was in July of 2010 when Facebook blogged, 
“With this new feature, tagging is faster since you don’t need to select a 
                                                            
59.  See Newsroom, supra note 56. 
60.  Ben Parr, Facebook by the Numbers [INFOGRAPHIC], MASHABLE SOC. MEDIA 
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/10/21/facebook-infographic/.  
61.  Derrick Harris, Facebook Shares Some Secrets on Making MySQL Scale, GIGAOM 
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://gigaom.com/cloud/facebook-shares-some-secrets-on-making-mysql-scale/; 
see also Kate Freeman, Facebook Apps:  Highlights of the 60 New Integrated Applications, 
MASHABLE SOC. MEDIA (Jan. 22, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/22/facebook-apps/ (ex-
plaining how applications integrated with Facebook allow Facebook users to share their activity 
on the application with their Facebook friends). 
62.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
63.  See TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/about_TRUSTe/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(stating that TRUSTe is a third-party company that monitors private companies to ensure compli-
ance with the companies’ stated privacy policy).  
64.  See Newsroom, supra note 56. 
65.  See generally Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
66.  See id. 
67.  See id. 
68.  See id. 
69.  See FACEBOOK BLOG, http://blog.facebook.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (provid-
ing a forum where Facebook employees give updates regarding new Facebook tools and features.  
To access THE FACEBOOK BLOG, users have to navigate their way through the Facebook “About” 
section, then to the “Info” section, and then click on the hyperlink that connects to the blog.  THE 
FACEBOOK BLOG then opens in a new window.  Users unaware of the blog had no notice of the 
changes Facebook was implementing.).  
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face.  It’s already selected for you, just like those rectangles you see around 
your friends’ faces when you take a photo with a modern digital camera.”70 
Facebook subsequently acquired Divvyshot, a photo-sharing site.71  
In September 2010, Sam Odio, Facebook’s Photo Products Manager, ex-
plained the technology behind the bulk tagging features Facebook began 
to use: 
  This isn’t face recognition.  . . .  Picasa and iPhoto—they’ll 
detect a face and say, “This is Sam,” and they’ll suggest that it’s 
Sam.  We’re not doing that.  We’re not linking any faces to pro-
files automatically.  Right now, we want to stay away from that 
because it’s a very touchy subject.72 
However, this statement was inaccurate.  Picasa and iPhoto use facial 
recognition data in a similar fashion to Facebook.73  As a matter of fact, the 
only difference between Picasa, iPhoto, and Facebook is that Facebook us-
es a different facial recognition software company.74  By December of 
2010, Facebook reported to its users that the website would begin using 
“tag suggestions,”75 and that the tool would be implemented in the United 
States starting in December 2010 and continue through January 2011.76  
Facebook further explained: 
When you or a friend upload new photos, we use face recogni-
tion software—similar to that found in many photo editing 
tools—to match your new photos to other photos you’re tagged 
                                                            
70.  Sam Odio, Making Facebook Photos Better, FACEBOOK BLOG (July 1, 2010, 5:37 
PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=403838582130. 
71.  See Erick Schonfeld, Facebook Buys Up Divvyshot To Make Facebook Photos Even 
Better, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/02/facebook-buys-up-
divvyshot-to-make-facebook-photos-even-better/ (stating Facebook purchased Divvyshot, a 
group photograph-sharing site).  
72.  See Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Photos Get High Resolution, Bulk Tagging, CNET 
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20018211-36.html. 
73.  Compare Josh Lowensohn, Facial Recognition Face-Off:  Three Tools Compared, 
CNET NEWS (Sept. 30, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27076_3-10363727-248.html (compar-
ing the facial recognition software that iPhoto and Picasa use and how the software is able to au-
tomatically recognize individuals in the photographs), with Purewal, supra note 2 (stating Face-
book is using facial recognition software that has the ability to recognize individuals in photo-
graphs posted on Facebook) (emphasis added).  
74.  See Lowensohn, supra note 73 (explaining how the facial recognition software works). 
75.  See Mitchell II, supra note 2. 
76.  See id.  
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in.  We group similar photos together and, whenever possible, 
suggest the name of the friend in the photos.77 
This announcement marked the first time Facebook confirmed it was using 
facial recognition software.78 
Although Odio stated that Facebook was not using facial recognition 
technology,79 less than a year later, Facebook’s Engineering Manager, Justin 
Mitchell, admitted Facebook was essentially actively using facial recogni-
tion technology with its tag suggestion software.80  The immediate availabil-
ity of tag suggestions inevitably meant that Facebook had been collecting its 
users’ biometric data before the 2011 release of the tag suggestion tool, oth-
erwise Facebook would not have been able to make the new technology in-
stantly available to its users.  Facebook soon thereafter admitted it had mis-
led users regarding its use of facial recognition software.81 
However, Facebook and its blog entries do not explain how the tag 
suggestions tool actually functions.82  For instance, the blog states that the 
tag suggestion tool is a default setting for all users,83 but there is no disclo-
sure that Facebook collects the data necessary to run the tool without user 
consent.84  Facebook users are only given the option to turn off the auto-
matic tagging feature and have their biometric data deleted only after the 
feature is installed.85  To turn off this feature, a user must navigate through 
                                                            
77.  See id. 
78.   See Caroline McCarthy, Facial Recognition Comes to Facebook Photo Tags, CNET 
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-20025818-36.html (“Facebook an-
nounced [Dec. 15, 2010] that it will soon enable facial-recognition technology,” which is “the 
first time facial recognition software has been incorporated into Facebook’s consumer service.”). 
79.  See McCarthy, supra note 72. 
80.  Mitchell I, supra note 1; see also Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Facial Recognition Tech-
nology Sparks Renewed Concerns, REUTERS (June 8, 2011) (“On Tuesday, Facebook said it had 
expanded the availability of its “Tag Suggestions” product, which uses facial recognition technology 
to automatically identify the people who appear in certain photos posed on Facebook.”). 
81.  See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (quoting Facebook’s spokesperson as saying, “[w]e 
should have been more clear with people during the roll-out process when this became available 
to them”). 
82.   Megan Geuss, Facebook Facial Recognition:  Its Quiet Rise and Dangerous Future, 
PCWORLD (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/226228/facebook_facial_recognition 
_its_quiet_rise_and_dangerous_future.html (assisting Facebook users in understanding how Face-
book’s facial recognition tool works because Facebook did not explain the facial recognition fea-
ture it had implemented). 
83.  See Mitchell I, supra note 1. 
84.  See id.  See generally FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69. 
85.  See In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, EPIC (June 10, 2011), 
http://epic.org/privacy/facebook/facebook_and_facial_recognitio.html (emphasis added). 
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his or her privacy settings to “opt out” of the tag suggestion service.86  In 
addition to opting out, a user has to send a message to Facebook and specif-
ically request that Facebook delete the data that it has collected.87  This 
multi-layered process is confusing and there is no instruction page or noti-
fication alerting users that opting out is an option.88  To compensate for 
Facebook’s instructional shortcomings, various news outlets began posting 
systematic manuals to assist Facebook users through the numerous steps 
required to remove the information.89 
C.  Facebook Users Should Be Concerned 
Facebook users should be concerned that Facebook stores their per-
sonally identifiable information for three main reasons.  First, Facebook 
has been involved in litigation as a result of its lack of privacy controls.  
Second, Facebook does not publicize how the biometric data is secured.  
Finally, Internet hackers have shown their resilience and capacity to infil-
trate the Internet servers of security firms to obtain sensitive information,90 
thus posing a potential threat to Facebook.  Without added protections and 
safeguards to ensure the safe storage of biometric data, Facebook users 
should request that Facebook delete their biometric data. 
                                                            
86.  Facebook customers are automatically opted into having their biometric data stored.  See 
Oreskovic, supra note 80 (explaining Facebook users had their data stored without their knowledge).  
However, due to a November 2011 settlement between the FTC and Facebook, the FTC now re-
quires Facebook to let users opt into changes that alter how their personal information is shared and 
stored.  See Elinor Mills, Facebook Privacy Practices Get FTC Shakeup, CNET NEWS (Nov. 29, 
2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-57333008-245/facebook-privacy-practices-get-ftc-
shakeup/ (discussing the settlement that was reached between the FTC and Facebook). 
87.  See EPIC Warns of Facebook ‘Biometric Data Collection’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 14, 
2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/162891/20110614/epic-ftc-facebook-facial-recognition.htm. 
88.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining how tag suggestions work, but notice-
ably lacking instructions on how users can compel Facebook to remove their biometric data from 
the database). 
89.  See e.g., Amy Lee, How to Disable Facebook’s New Facial Recognition Feature, 
HUFFINGTON POST TECH. (June 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/disable-
facebook-facial-recognition-photo-feature_n_873018.html. 
90.  See e.g., Nate Anderson, How One Man Tracked Down Anonymous—and Paid a 
Heavy Price, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/02/how-
one-security-firm-tracked-anonymousand-paid-a-heavy-price.ars/. 
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1.  Old Habits Die Hard:  Facebook’s Privacy Litigation 
Facebook has a nonchalant attitude toward its users’ privacy,91 which 
has been highlighted in various lawsuits involving Facebook’s lack of pri-
vacy protections.92  For example, in In re Facebook Privacy Litigation the 
district court held that Facebook did not violate the law when it provided its 
users’ personally identifiable information to third-party advertisers because 
the advertisers were the intended recipients of the information.93  Neverthe-
less, without its users’ knowledge, Facebook facilitated the transmission of 
its users’ personally identifiable information to third parties when a user 
clicked on an advertisement posted on Facebook.94 
Another more recent example is In Re Zynga Privacy Litigation, a class 
action alleging the Facebook application Zynga was transmitting Facebook 
User IDs (“UIDs”) to third parties, such as advertisers and Internet tracking 
firms.95  Each Facebook user has his or her own unique UID,96 and when an 
advertiser has access to a user’s UID, that advertiser is able to discover a us-
er’s personal information.97  The information accessible to the advertiser in-
cludes the user’s real name, any public information listed on his or her pro-
file, and the user’s web-browsing history—information the user did not know 
was being transmitted to the advertiser.98  Accordingly, Facebook users need 
not only be aware of Facebook’s privacy policy, but they must also under-
stand the privacy policies of Facebook’s advertising partners. 
Although these two lawsuits are only a fragment of the litigation in 
which Facebook has been involved, both cases emphasize that Facebook 
passes along its users’ private information, often without specific permis-
                                                            
91.  See Jessica E. Vascellaro, Facebook Grapples With Privacy Issues, WALL ST. J. 
TECH. (May 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870491200457525272310 
9845974.html (describing Facebook’s various privacy problems and the view of Facebook’s 
founder, Mark Zuckerberg, that users should be more open with their information).   
92.  See id.   
93.  See In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
94.  See id. at 709, 711–13. 
95.  See Ian Paul, Zynga Hit With Lawsuit Over Facebook Privacy Breach, PCWORLD 
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.pcworld.com/article/208267/zynga_hit_with_lawsuit_over_ 
facebook_privacy_breach.html. 
96.  See id. 
97.  See id. 
98.  See id.; see also Richard Esguerra, Facebook’s Broken Promises:  Facebook Apps 
Leaking Private Data to Advertisers and Trackers, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 18, 
2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/facebooks-broken-promises-facebook-apps-leaking 
(“Internet advertising networks claim to track users ‘anonymously,’ but the Facebook leak allows 
these web marketing snoops to associate Facebook users with the supposedly-anonymous brows-
ing-history cookies that trackers use to see a user’s movements across the web.”). 
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sion from the user.  This litigation illuminates the way in which Facebook 
will likely treat the biometric data currently in its control and should un-
doubtedly raise concern among Facebook users. 
2.  Facebook Should Create a Strategy to Prevent Privacy Violations 
Federal agencies have developed and implemented strategies to en-
sure that their collection of biometric data will not violate individual priva-
cy concerns, and, further, to prevent the compromising of valuable personal 
information.99  While the purpose of the use varies among federal agencies, 
facial recognition technology is often used for national security.100  For ex-
ample, the technology allows law enforcement agencies to identify un-
known individuals in photos using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
(“FBI”) database of 10 million stored mug shots.101  Unlike Facebook, be-
fore the implementation of facial recognition technology, the FBI studied 
research from the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Bio-
metrics and Identity Management subcommittee and released a Privacy 
Impact Assessment (“PIA”).102  The model described in the FBI’s PIA is 
similar to the model suggested by the Biometrics and Identity Management 
subcommittee to determine whether a biometric system adequately protects 
information privacy.103 
The Biometrics and Identity Management subcommittee’s (“BIM”) 
model is geared toward government agencies, but, nevertheless, the model 
lends insight into what a proper privacy assessment should entail.104  BIM 
recommends that the privacy assessment should begin at the collection 
phase by determining the expectations of the participants who have chosen 
to enroll in the data collection system.105  Subsequently, there should be:  
(1) documentation of the purpose and scope of the data collection to make 
                                                            
99.  SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 43–49.  
100.  Face Recognition, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/facerecognition/ (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2012) (stating the Government has used facial recognition technology for security pur-
poses such as border control and general policing purposes). 
101.  See Aliya Sternsteing, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial Recognition Service, 
NEXTGOV.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111007_6100.php. 
102.  See id.  
103.  Compare SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 40, with Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
Next Generation Identification Interstate Photo System, FBI.GOV (June 9, 2008), http://www. 
fbi.gov/foi/privacy_impact-assessments/interstate-photo-system.  
104.  See SAND ET AL., supra note 44, at 54 (stating the primary objective of NSTC is “the 
establishment of clear national goals for Federal science and technology investments,” and 
NSTC’s research and development strategies are to assist Federal agencies in coordinating na-
tional goals (emphasis added)). 
105.  See id. at 45 (emphasis added).  
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certain the data is not used for unintended purposes; (2) a privacy review of 
the data to ensure the minimal amount of data is being collected to achieve 
the purpose of the agency; (3) identification of other technologies being 
used to better assess how the personal data will be used; (4) routine audits 
of the data and its uses and assessment of the control of individuals to use 
the information; (5) a review of the created template from the observed da-
ta; and (6) a decision regarding which data will be stored.106  If implement-
ed properly, BIM projects the system is less apt to infringe on the privacy 
rights of the data subjects.107  Again, while this model is focused at gov-
ernment agencies and their use of biometric data, it is accessible by private 
companies, such as Facebook. 
Supposing Facebook users know that their data fuels the facial recog-
nition tool, there is still no assurance from Facebook that this data will sole-
ly be used in the tag suggestions tool.108  Without a clear statement of pur-
pose, as suggested in the BIM model and followed by Government agencies, 
there is a strong likelihood the biometric data will be used by Facebook for 
purposes other than those originally intended and used without the informed 
and voluntary consent of users.109  The process of using information beyond 
the originally intended scope has been termed “function creep.”110 
Despite the potential privacy violation, function creep is almost inevi-
table because “[t]he existence of a relatively high integrity scheme would 
create irresistible temptations to apply it widely, and interrelate many hith-
erto separate collections of personal information.”111  Accordingly, in terms 
of Facebook’s collection of biometric data, function creep is a viable and 
likely possibility, as Facebook does not guarantee its users’ biometric data 
will be used solely for the purpose of facilitating the tagging process.112  In 
                                                            
106.  See id. at 45–49. 
107.  See id. at 53. 
108.  See Purewal, supra note 2. 
109.  See JOHN D. WOODWARD ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS:  IDENTIFYING 
AND ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS 24 (RAND 2001).   
110.  See Simon G. Davies, Touching Big Brother:  How Biometric Technology Will Fuse 
Flesh and Machine, 7 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 44 (1994); see also Sloan v. SC Dep’t of Pub. Safe-
ty, No. 25689 (filed Aug. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/ 
SC/25689.htm (describing an example of function creep that occurred in 1998.  The South Caro-
lina Department of Public Safety sold information and photographs used on South Carolina driv-
ers’ licenses and identification cards to Data Image, LLC.  Plaintiff was aware that her infor-
mation was used for her driver’s license, but the transmittal and use of the information beyond its 
immediate and obvious scope of use, for driver’s licenses, was a surprise to Plaintiff.  As a result, 
the sale eventually resulted in a privacy lawsuit.). 
111.  See Davies, supra note 110, at 38–47 (emphasis added). 
112.  See Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/settings/?tab=privacy 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (allowing Facebook users to turn off the tag suggestions feature, but 
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addition, Facebook does not have a posted policy stating its projected use 
of the biometric data.113  The lack of a strategic model makes privacy viola-
tions more likely, based on BMI’s and privacy experts’ projections. 
3.  Facebook is Not Hacker114 Proof 
Facebook is not immune from the wrath of hackers and security 
threats, thus making its database of information a potential target for exter-
nal abuse.115  Facebook’s Security page contains an instructional aide to as-
sist users who have had their Facebook profiles compromised (also known 
as “hacked”) and provides information on how to avoid being a victim of 
online fraud.116  Despite this instructional aid, Facebook estimates it has 
approximately 600,000 imposters accessing users’ personal information on 
a daily basis.117  In fact, in January of 2011, Facebook Founder Mark Zuck-
erberg’s Facebook fan page was hacked.118 
                                                            
lacking explanation regarding what the data will additionally be used for or that users can request 
that Facebook delete their biometric data).  While Facebook does explain that it will extract meta-
data, Facebook fails to include that in addition to the time, date, and place the photograph was 
taken, it also measures the facial features of the people in the photographs.  See Data Use Policy, 
supra note 12 (explaining to Facebook users that “[w]hen [users] post things like photos or videos 
on Facebook, [Facebook] may receive additional related data (or metadata), such as the time, 
date, and place [users] took the photo or video.”).  Also, by mere definition, biometric data and 
metadata are not one and the same—biometric data is information that can identify an individual, 
while metadata is background information about a photograph or document, such as when the 
photograph was taken or if it has been modified.  Compare Woodward, Horn, Gatune & Thomas, 
supra note 33 (defining biometric data as “a measurable . . . distinctive physical characteristic or 
personal trait that can be used to identify an individual”), with Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. Au-
tomationDirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 556, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining metadata as information 
regarding “when the document was created [and] when it was modified . . . .”). 
113.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (discussing the use of data, but failing to men-
tion the full extent of the use of biometric data). 
114.  The term “hacker” is used to describe an individual who secretly manipulates net-
work connections and/or breaks into computer systems.  See Ken Hess, What Is a Hacker?, 
ZDNET (Sept. 27, 2011, 3:05 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/what-is-a-hacker/9468.  
115.  See e.g., Emma Barnet, Hackers Go After Facebook Sites 600,000 Times Every Day, 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 29, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8856417/Hackers-
go-after-Facebook-sites-600000-times-every-day.html. 
116.  Facebook Security, How To Help Your Friends with Security Issues, FACEBOOK 
(Apr. 27, 2011), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150165098990766. 
117.  See Barnet, supra note 115. 
118.  See Ian Paul, Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook Fan Page Hacked,  PCWORLD (Jan. 
26, 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/217784/mark_zuckerbergs_facebook_fan_page_ 
hacked.html. 
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While Facebook has been previously hacked, the damage from hack-
ing has not been exceedingly detrimental to its users.119  However, this 
does not mean the potential for hackers to delve into the Facebook data-
base does not exist.  Hackers have flaunted their abilities by hacking into 
the databases of gaming companies and accessing gamers’ personal infor-
mation, including credit card information.120  A recent example of the 
prowess of hackers is the ambush on the security firm HBGary.121  
HBGary provides resources to protect the assets and information of gov-
ernments and private corporations from espionage.122  Despite HBGary’s 
background and field of expertise, in February 2011, a notorious group 
called Anonymous hacked HBGary’s database.123  Anonymous124 was able 
to access the security firm’s database, including the log-in credentials of 
its Chief Executive Officer, which were used to administer a corporate 
e-mail account.125 
Anonymous’s members later threatened to target Facebook in No-
vember 2011.126  Although the attack did not occur and Anonymous later 
claimed the threat was merely a hoax, the implication caused security spe-
cialists to contemplate the possibility of an attack on Facebook.127  Again, 
Facebook has been fortunate in that it has managed to avoid a major breach 
of their database; nevertheless, the possibility does exist in light of the ca-
pabilities of groups such as Anonymous.  Facebook users should thus be 
                                                            
119.  See e.g., Facebook Hacked:  Are you Seeing Images of Porn and Violence?, ZDNET 
(Nov. 14, 2011, 8:21 PM), www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/facebook-hacked-are-you-seeing-
images-of-porrn-and-violence/5314 (discussing that Facebook was hacked, resulting in select us-
ers being flooded with pornographic images); see also Facebook Security:  Take Action, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/security?sk=app_10442206389 (last visited Apr. 15, 
2012) (stating accounts have been taken over and used to send spam messages). 
120.  Winda Benedetti, Steam Game Service Hacked, Credit Card Theft Investigated, 
MSNBC.COM (Nov. 10, 2011), http://ingame.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/11/10/8742607-steam-
game-service-hacked-credit-card-theft-investigated. 
121.  See John Leyden, Anonymous Security Firm Hack Used Every Trick In Book, 
REGISTER (Feb. 17, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/17/hbgary_hack_redux. 
122.  Company, HBGARY, http://hbgary.com/company (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
123.  See Leyden, supra note 121. 
124.  Declan McCullagh, Alleged Anonymous Members Plead Not Guilty, CNET NEWS 
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20100790-281/alleged-anonymous-members 
-plead-not-guilty/ (describing Anonymous as a group of “activists who have electronically as-
saulted commercial and governmental Web sites” by computer hacking). 
125.  See Leyden, supra note 121. 
126.  See Adam Clark Estes, Nobody Believes Anonymous Can Hack Facebook, ATLANT-
IC WIRE (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/08/nobody-believes-
anonymous-can-hack-facebook/41086/.  
127.  See id. 
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concerned with Facebook storing information regarding the intimate details 
of their faces and identities. 
III.  FACEBOOK’S PRIVACY VIOLATIONS 
When Facebook users began identifying their friends in photos, few 
knew that Facebook was storing their friends’ biometric data with each 
identifying click.128  Facebook’s act of collecting biometric data from its 
consumers is an invasion of privacy because biometric data that is continu-
ously used is collected without user consent.129  The data, as shown above, 
is highly personal and private to all Facebook users.130  Additionally, most 
users may not anticipate that Facebook uses facial recognition technology 
to create an algorithm of their faces131 when they simply upload photos to 
Facebook.132  The following section provides an analysis of the potential 
constitutional privacy violations and potential violations of the applicable 
privacy torts as a result of Facebook’s conduct. 
A.  Constitutional Violations 
Due to the state action doctrine, private conduct generally does not 
have to comply with the Constitution.133  However, there are circumstances 
where the acts of a private individual may be deemed that of the state.134  
Simply put, a private individual may be deemed a state actor when the ac-
tions of the private party can be considered “fairly attributable” to the 
                                                            
128.  See Purewal, supra note 2 (explaining that each time a Facebook user is “tagged” or 
identified in an image by a Facebook user, Facebook’s facial recognition technology learns more 
about the identified member’s appearance).  See generally Gardiner, supra note 35 (explaining 
that face recognition tools are able to recognize faces by creating algorithms consisting of bio-
metric data or “meaningful facial features”). 
129.  See Purewal, supra note 2 (suggesting that Facebook collects users’ biometric in-
formation to use for its facial recognition tool). 
130.  See supra Part II. 
131.  See Angela Moscaritolo, Shocker:  Facebook Users Hate Surprise Photo Tagging, 
PCMAG.COM (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2400357,00.asp (stating 
Facebook uses facial recognition technology for its tag suggestions tool and that the tag sugges-
tions tool was turned on by Facebook without warning to Facebook users); see also Gardiner, 
supra note 35 (explaining that facial recognition systems use algorithms (composed of key facial 
features) to identify individuals in photographs).  
132.  See Milian, supra note 6 (explaining that when Facebook users upload a photo-
graph on Facebook, Facebook uses facial recognition technology to identify the individuals in 
the photograph).  
133.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (Vicki Been et al. eds. 3d ed. 
2009). 
134.  See id. at 552 (describing the exceptions to the state action doctrine). 
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state.135  To be “fairly attributable,” the private party must either be:  
(1) performing a sovereign function;136 (2) engaging in a joint activity with 
the state, resulting in either a concerted activity or a mutually beneficial re-
lationship;137 or (3) performing an act that is affirmatively authorized by the 
state.138  Once a private actor is found to be performing an action fairly at-
tributable to the state, the private actor is deemed a “state actor.”139  Al-
though a very difficult standard to meet, Facebook could potentially be 
considered to be in a mutually beneficial relationship140 with the Govern-
ment, thus making the United States Constitution applicable.  Facebook al-
lows the United States Government access to Facebook’s database and 
user information.141  The standard for a mutually beneficial relationship 
                                                            
135.  See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–38 (1982) (discussing that in order 
for the Fourteenth Amendment to be made applicable to the plaintiff, the actions of the plaintiff 
must be “fairly attributed” to the State). 
136.  See generally id. at 842.  
137.  See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris, 407 U.S. 163, 172, 175 (1972).  See generally 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).  
138.  See generally Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967). 
139.  Sheila Kennedy, When is Private Public?  State Action in the Era of Privatization 
and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 203, 209–10 (2001) (stating a 
private act becomes attributable to the government, or a state action,  “[w]hen the relationship 
between government and citizen becomes more complex than that between a mere commodity or 
service provider and its customers”). 
140.  See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–25 (holding that the City and the private party had a 
mutually beneficial relationship; a relationship where, considering numerous factors, the state and 
private actor both profited from the relationship). 
141.  Accord Julie Masis, Is this Lawman Your Facebook Friend?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 11, 
2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/01/11/is_this_lawman_your_facebook_ 
friend?page=full (stating there are documented incidents where law enforcement has in fact used 
Facebook in pursuing investigations).  See generally Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining 
Facebook shares user information when lawfully requested.  For Facebook to share user informa-
tion there need only be “good faith belief” that the disclosure is required or that it is necessary to 
protect users.); see also Safety Center, Information for Law Enforcement Authorities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law/guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating 
Facebook “disclose[s] account records solely in accordance with [its] terms of service and appli-
cable law, including the federal Stored Communications Act,” which prohibits Facebook from 
releasing contents of a user account without a civil subpoena, court order, or warrant); Facebook 
and Law Enforcement, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/safety/groups/law  (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2012) (disclosing Facebook provides a limited amount of information to help law en-
forcement officials do their jobs); JOHN LYNCH & JENNY ELLICKSON, OBTAINING AND USING 
EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES:  FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, LINKEDIN, AND MORE, 
COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SEC., DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 3, 2010), available at https:// 
www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf (explaining in 
the Department of Justice’s training materials that employees are able to use social media net-
works to “[r]eveal personal communications; [e]stablish motives and personal relationships; 
[p]rovide location information; [p]rove and disprove alibis; [and] [e]stablish crime or criminal 
enterprise,” among other “instrumentalities or fruits of crime.”  Although the materials do not 
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requires interdependence, with the state profiting from the specific activi-
ty challenged.142  Here, the challenged activity would be Facebook’s col-
lection and use of its users’ biometric data.  Although the state is not re-
sponsible for Facebook’s collection of biometric data, it could be shown 
that both the state and Facebook derive a benefit from the relationship.143 
Facebook permits the United States Government access to user infor-
mation when there is a “good faith belief” that disclosure to the Govern-
ment is required or necessary to protect users.144  In fact, the Government 
paid a private company $11 million to “monitor and prepare surveillance 
reports on public reaction [to major Government proposals] posted on 
Facebook.”145  While this example does not furnish direct insight into the 
Government’s handling of biometric data on Facebook, it does suggest the 
Government is readily accessing Facebook users’ information and demon-
strates the types of information Facebook is able to provide to the govern-
ment.  In addition, state law enforcement agencies are able to access Face-
book databases for policing purposes.146  With access to Facebook’s 
database, the Government conceivably has access to the biometric data of 
all Facebook users—approximately 800 million people.147 
While it is certainly feasible that law enforcement and/or the Gov-
ernment is using Facebook’s biometric data, the extent of the relationship is 
uncertain because Facebook does not reveal how frequently the Govern-
ment traffics and utilizes the website.148  It is clear, however, that Facebook 
                                                            
expressly mention Facebook, there is information in the training materials regarding “tagging”—
verbiage unique to Facebook.). 
142.  Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–25 (holding that the City and the private party had a mutual-
ly beneficial relationship; a relationship where, considering numerous factors both parties profited 
from the relationship). 
143.  See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842–43 (explaining that in order for the defendant to 
be found a state actor the relationship must be mutually beneficial and both parties must derive a 
benefit from the precise activity being challenged). 
144.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (stating Facebook will share information in re-
sponse to legal requests from jurisdictions inside and outside of the United States). 
145.  See Andrea Stone, DHS Monitoring of Social Media Under Scrutiny By Lawmakers, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/dhs-monitoring-
of-social-media_n_1282494.html. 
146.  See Facebook and Law Enforcement, supra note 141 (stating Facebook allows law 
enforcement agencies to access the Facebook database as long as a court order or civil subpoena 
is granted). 
147.  Id. 
148.  See Jeff John Roberts, The Relationship Between Facebook and the Law, GLOBE & 
MAIL (Jul. 12, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/digital-culture/social-
networking/the-relationship-between-facebook-and-the-law/article2094889/ (stating “Facebook 
apparently did not inform account-holders or their lawyers about government snooping” and fur-
ther describing the relationship between Facebook and the government.  Notably, in an interview 
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donates money to federal candidates to protect itself from stringent privacy 
policies, further entangling the two parties.149  Facebook has formed a po-
litical action committee that allows employees to funnel contributions to 
federal candidates who share objectives similar to those of Facebook.150  
Moreover, on the “Facebook Live” page, Facebook frequently endorses 
candidates by featuring their discussions live.151  The connection between 
Facebook and the Government appears to continually expand, and argua-
bly, so does their mutually beneficial relationship.152 
1.  The Fourth Amendment’s Privacy Protection of the  
Person and Possessions 
Assuming Facebook can surpass the difficult test of being deemed a 
state actor, a Facebook user may choose to invoke his or her Constitutional 
right to privacy.153  The Constitution does not expressly grant the right to 
privacy; however, a privacy right is implied through the “penumbras” found 
within the Constitution.154  Precedent holds that the Fourth Amendment 
provides each individual with a right to privacy where there is:  (1) an actual 
expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation is reasonable based on socie-
tal standards.155  However, any reasonable expectation of privacy is relin-
quished when information is given to a third party because the third party 
then has the ability to inspect and consume the information in any manner 
he or she sees fit.156  This doctrine is termed the “third party doctrine” and 
undoubtedly becomes an obstacle for Facebook users bringing suit.157 
Nevertheless, Facebook is violating its users’ privacy irrespective of 
the third party doctrine.158  Facebook users have an expectation of privacy 
                                                            
Facebook Chief Security Officer Joe Sullivan remained silent when pressed to reveal how many 
warrants had been served on Facebook.). 
149.  See Jim Puzzanghera, Facebook to Launch Its Own Political Action Committee, L.A. 
TIMES TECH. (Sept. 26, 2011, 3:03 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/09/ 
facebook-to-launch-its-own-political-action-committee-.html. 
150.   See id. 
151.  See Facebook Live, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/FBLive?sk=wall (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2012).  
152.  See Roberts, supra note 148 (explaining the expanding relationship between Face-
book and the Government). 
153.  See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right to 
privacy as legitimate and preventing state actors from influencing intimate decisions). 
154.  Id. at 484. 
155.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
156.  California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
157.  See id.  
158.  See id. 
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in their biometric data.  The many users who were both surprised and hos-
tile upon discovering that their biometric data was being extracted from 
pictures exemplify an actual expectation of privacy in this information.159  
Society seems to agree that this information is private.  Most individuals, 
for instance, protect personally identifiable information, such as their social 
security numbers, which is comparable to biometric data.160  The challenge 
becomes the third party doctrine.  When users upload photos on Facebook, 
they transmit and share information with third parties, such as their Face-
book friends and Facebook itself.161  Based on the third party doctrine, 
Facebook users lose any reasonable expectation of privacy in their photo-
graphs upon such transmittal.  While users lose their reasonable expectation 
of privacy to their photographs, do they additionally lose their reasonable 
expectation of privacy to their biometric data?162 
As technology advances, so does the idea of privacy rights.163  For ex-
ample, in Kyllo v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that searches 
involving technological advances that reveal “intimate details” of the home 
are an improper search and thus violate a person’s privacy rights.164  Similar-
ly, Facebook is using advanced technology to extract intimate details from a 
person’s photo.165  Thus, the argument could be made that a Facebook user 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning his or her biometric data, 
since the technology used to collect the data is not just a simple enhance-
ment, but rather an invasion into a person’s intimate details.166  Overall, as 
discussed, finding a Constitutional violation would be a difficult task with 
multiple hurdles.  Accordingly, a California user may have a greater chance 
in bringing suit by alleging violations of the California Constitution. 
                                                            
159.  See Daily Mail Reporter, supra note 7. 
160.  Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing the Expectations of Online Privacy:  Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should be Protected As Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 895, 903 (describing how Social Security numbers and biometric data can both identify 
specific individuals). 
161.  Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (describing that when users post images on Face-
book, Facebook receives the information from the photographs, in addition to the individual users 
allowed to see the image). 
162.  Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40–41 (explaining that generally, when an individual gives 
information to a third party, the individual then loses his or her reasonable expectation of privacy 
in that information). 
163.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).  
164.  See id. 
165.  McCullagh, supra note 5. 
166.  Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
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2.  The California Constitutional Violations 
States have the ability to afford greater rights than the federal gov-
ernment, ergo the state of California has granted its citizens more privacy 
protection than the federal government.167  As a result, Facebook has vio-
lated the California Constitution as well.  Assuming Facebook is a state ac-
tor, the California Constitution is applicable to Facebook because there is 
personal jurisdiction—the right to subject Facebook to California laws.168  
The personal jurisdiction analysis necessary to determine whether Face-
book is subject to California law is as follows:  (1) the corporation’s head-
quarters are in Menlo Park,169 and (2) the privacy violations occurred in, 
were directed from, and emanated from California.170  Additionally, per-
sonal jurisdiction exists for the following reasons: 
1. [A] substantial portion of the wrongdoing took place in 
California;171 
2. Facebook is authorized to do business in California;172 
3. Facebook has sufficient minimum contacts with the 
state;173 and 
                                                            
167.  Leonel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 2005). 
168.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–320 (1945) (holding that personal 
jurisdiction exists when a corporation is carrying on systematic and continuous activities within a 
state, and those activities result in a “large volume of interstate business, in the course of which 
[that corporation] received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state”). 
169.  Careers, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/careers/life.php (last visited Apr. 
16, 2012). 
170.  Facebook’s headquarters, where decisions regarding the facial recognition tool were 
made, are in California.  See id. 
171.  The wrongdoing argued in this Comment is the taking of biometric data from Face-
book users’ images.  This decision to implement the facial recognition tool was likely made at the 
Facebook headquarters because the headquarters are the location where the decision-making indi-
viduals are stationed and perform their work.  See Careers:  Menlo Park, CA, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/careers/department.php?dept=menlo-park (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) 
(discussing the positions that are stationed at Facebook headquarters include Corporate Commu-
nications, Business Development, Program Management, Data Center Designs, etc.). 
172.  Complaint at 8, Juror Number One v. California, No. 11CV00397, 2011 WL 
507296 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (“Defendant FACEBOOK, INC., is . . . authorized to do busi-
ness in California.”). 
173.  Since a majority of Facebook’s decisions and work is done at its headquarters in Cal-
ifornia, minimum contacts can be established.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
464, 487 (1985) (discussing that minimum contacts can be determined by establishing the com-
pany had “substantial and continuing relationship” in the jurisdiction.  Factors considered to make 
the determination that a relationship exists include, but are not limited to, the percent of business 
completed at the operation.). 
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4. Facebook intentionally avails itself of the markets in the 
state through the promotion, marketing and sale of 
products and services in the state.174 
With personal jurisdiction established, California’s constitutionally 
established “inalienable right” to privacy is thus applicable to Facebook.175  
There is no categorical test to prove a privacy violation in California.176  
Instead, a plaintiff must meet a threshold to establish a valid claim.177  To 
support a valid claim, the plaintiff must establish, at the minimum:  “(1) a 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to 
a serious invasion of the protected privacy interest.”178 
If a plaintiff is able to meet the threshold requirements, the court will 
engage in a balancing test that measures the countervailing interests sup-
porting the conduct in question and the intrusion of privacy resulting from 
the conduct.179  A plaintiff may rebut a showing of countervailing interests 
by demonstrating that there were “‘feasible and effective alternatives’ with 
a ‘lesser impact on privacy interests.’”180  The California standard is easier 
to meet than the federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment standard be-
cause in California, the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
based on “customs, practices, and physical settings” surrounding the al-
leged violation, any notice provided, and any consent obtained.181 
The Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press decision, in which the court 
held that the Associated Press did not violate any privacy rights by re-
posting photographs originally posted on a website maintained by the 
plaintiff, highlights the application of the California standard.182  In Four 
Navy Seals, the wife of a Navy Seal maintained an online photo album, 
                                                            
174.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475–76 (establishing that for personal jurisdiction to 
exist, defendant must meet the purposeful availment criteria, which take into account defendant’s 
activities within a state). 
175.  See Hooser v. Super. Ct., 84 Cal. App. 4th 997 (2000). 
176.  Leonel, 400 F.3d at 712. 
177.  See id. 
178.  See id. 
179.  Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab, 135 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998). 
180.  Id. at 1271. 
181.  Compare id. at 1269 (stating that the test for a violation of privacy is a balancing test 
that considers the degree of intrusiveness, the state’s interests in requiring intrusion, and the effi-
cacy of the state’s means for meeting its needs), with Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 
Cal. 4th 1, 30 (1994) (“[T]he diversity of federal constitutional ‘privacy’ interests has left the fed-
eral right to privacy . . . without any coherent legal definition or standard.”). 
182.  Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 
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which included images of her husband and other active duty Navy Seal 
members in full uniform abusing war prisoners.183  An Associated Press re-
porter discovered the images while performing a search on the Internet, 
downloaded them, and eventually published them.184  The court stated that 
the Navy Seals did not have a reasonable expectation that the images would 
remain private after posting the images online, and thus the members had 
no right to privacy under California’s constitution.185 
Similar to the wife in Four Navy Seals, Facebook users are willingly 
posting images online.186  Nonetheless, Facebook’s actions are distinguisha-
ble.  Facebook did more than simply repost the image in a different forum; 
Facebook used the image to extract sensitive information from unsuspecting 
users.187  The act of extracting biometric data is not foreseeable, especially 
when Facebook users were unaware Facebook was using facial recognition 
technology.188  Most users know how to download a photograph from Face-
book because it is a simple process.189  However, due to the complex nature 
of creating facial recognition algorithms, the vast majority of users likely 
does not compile information from photographs posted on Facebook to cre-
ate a facial template of their friends, thus enabling them to link a user to his 
or her Facebook profile and other sensitive information.190 
Thus, when applying the standard emanated in Four Navy Seals, 
Facebook users cannot expect the image itself to remain private, but have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as to their biometric data.  Before the da-
ta collection, Facebook did not provide notice or obtain consent from its 
users, as it was only after the data collection that Facebook announced its 
                                                            
183.  Id. at 1141. 
184.  See id. 
185.  See id. at 1143. 
186.  See id. 
187.  See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (stating that sensitive information like e-mail addresses 
may become associated with the Facebook database, and quoting Facebook’s spokesperson as 
saying, “we should have been more clear with people during the roll-out process when this be-
came available to them”). 
188.  Id. (“[W]e should have been more clear during the roll-out process when this became 
available to them.”). 
189.  See Jaime A. Madell, The Poster’s Plight:  Bringing the Public Disclosure Tort 
Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 895, 900 (2011) (“[A] user could simply click the ‘down-
load’ link that appears underneath photos in the Facebook viewing console.”). 
190.  See Face Recognition, BIOMETRICS.GOV, 1 (2006), available at http://www. 
biometrics.gov/Documents/facerec.pdf (describing how facial recognition has become a “science 
of sophisticated mathematical representations and matching processes”); see also Keller, supra 
note 11 (describing how, with the use of facial recognition programs, individuals can connect a 
stranger to his or her identity and other private information). 
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use of facial recognition technology.191  Additionally, it was not the usual 
practice and custom of Facebook to collect the biometric data of its us-
ers.192  As a result, Facebook users would have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy as to the collection of their biometric data. 
B.  Facebook’s Common Law Tort Violations 
Privacy torts protect individuals from the “mental pain and distress” 
inflicted by the broadcasting of personal details.193  There are four different 
torts that encompass the common theme of the right “to be let alone”[:]194  
(1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) publicity given to private life; (3) publicity 
placing person in a false light; and (4) appropriation of name or likeness.195  
The two torts Facebook is potentially violating are:  (1) appropriation of 
name or likeness and (2) intrusion upon seclusion. 
1.  Appropriation of Name or Likeness 
There is an appropriation of name or likeness when:  (1) a plaintiff’s 
name or likeness is used for the commercial benefit (2) without consent or 
a license.196  The primary interest is similar to a property right—the ability 
of an individual to have the exclusive rights to his or her identity.197 
It is no secret Facebook uses its members for commercial benefit; Face-
book’s members have become tools to attract advertisers.198  As a result, 
Facebook has an incentive to increase its user base, thus enabling it to have 
                                                            
191.  See Oreskovic, supra note 80 (“[W]e should have been more clear with people dur-
ing the roll-out process when this became available to them.”). 
192.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (stating that one’s name, profile pictures, net-
work, and username are always publically available, but all other data collected is that which one 
may choose to make public). 
193.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
196 (1890). 
194.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
195.  Id. at 389 (dividing privacy torts into four distinct torts). 
196.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977). 
197.  Id. (“The interest protected by the rule stated in this Section is the interest of the in-
dividual in the exclusive use of his own identity . . . .”). 
198.  See Eric Eldon, Facebook Revenues up to $700 Million in 2009, On Track Towards 
$1.1 Billion in 2010, INSIDE FACEBOOK (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/03/ 
02/facebook-made-up-to-700-million-in-2009-on-track-towards-1-1-billion-in-2010/; see also 
Facebook Ads, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/advertising/?campaign_id=402047449186 
&placement=pf&extra_1=0 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) (indicating to potential clients that Face-
book provides the ability to “[c]onnect with more than 800 million potential customers”). 
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more users to market.199  Facebook is able to increase its user base and com-
pete with similar networking websites by updating its features and tools to 
enhance and facilitate the networking experience—one such enhancement 
being the tag suggestions feature.200  With each enhancement, Facebook col-
lects more user data201 and is able to use this data to entice advertisers to 
market their products on Facebook.202  Facebook’s database of biometric da-
ta is especially appealing to marketing companies that are already using faci-
al recognition technology to tailor ads and suggestions to consumers.203 
Furthermore, Facebook often bestows advertising companies with its 
users’ personal information, their names and likenesses, for financial profit 
without those users’ consent and knowledge.204  For example, Facebook 
faced a lawsuit in October 2010 concerning a leak of user ID numbers to 
outside advertising firms.205  Facebook’s privacy policy states it will not 
sell its users’ personal information.206  However, when a user clicks on a 
third party advertisement, Facebook simultaneously sends a referral.207  The 
referral “reveals the specific webpage [sic] address that the user was look-
ing at prior to clicking on the advertisement,” and may transmit “substan-
                                                            
199.  See Jeff Macke, 3 Ways Facebook Plans to Exploit Users, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/3-ways-facebook-ipo-exploit-users-172215377.html 
(discussing how ninety percent of Facebook’s revenue is derived from Facebook selling users’ 
information to advertisers, which had generated a revenue of $3.7 billion.  Thus, Facebook is able 
to generate $4.50 with each user.). 
200.  See Jason DeRusha, Good Question:  Why Does Facebook Keep Changing?, 
CBSMINNESOTA.COM (Sept. 22, 2011), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2011/09/22/good-question 
-why-does-facebook-keep-changing/; see also Barbara Ortutay, Q&A:  The latest “New Face-
book”, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2011-09-23/ 
facebook-user-guide/50529242/1. 
201.  See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy:  A Timeline, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline/ 
(explaining how Facebook has evolved and now requires users to list particular information and 
also allow the information to be made public). 
202.  See Facebook for Business, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (showing advertisers that they will be able to hand pick their audience 
based on information users have listed on their profile, such as their location and education). 
203.  See Shan Li & David Sarno, Advertisers Start Using Facial Recognition to Tailor 
Pitches, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/business/la-fi-facial 
-recognition-20110821. 
204.  See Macke, supra note 199 (discussing how Facebook sells its user’s information). 
205.  See District Court Upholds Facebook’s Practice of Forwarding User Information to 
Online Advertisers, LAW, TECH. & ARTS BLOG (July 17, 2011), http://wjlta.wordpress.com/2011/ 
07/17/ninth-circuit-upholds-facebook%E2%80%99s-practice-of-forwarding-user-information-to-
online-advertisers/. 
206.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
207.   See District Court Upholds Facebook’s Practice of Forwarding User Information to 
Online Advertisers, supra note 205. 
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tial” information about the user.208  Despite the court’s holding that Face-
book’s practice of disclosing information was not illegal,209 the court rec-
ognized that Facebook “shares users’ personal information with third-party 
advertisers without users’ knowledge or consent, in violation of [Face-
book]’s own policies.”210 
Facebook has already collected its users’ facial templates (their like-
nesses) without their consent.211  In light of Facebook’s past and current 
use of its users’ data, it is evident Facebook is familiar with profiting from 
its users’ likenesses.212  Now, with access to each of its users’ personally 
identifiable information, Facebook conceivably will be able to further prof-
it from its users’ likenesses. 
2.  Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Facebook could also be liable for intrusion upon seclusion.  Under 
this tort theory, a plaintiff needs to prove the defendant has substantially 
interfered and intruded upon the plaintiff’s personal and private affairs.213  
An act is considered a substantial intrusion if it is an intentional interfer-
ence with a private place or matter in which a plaintiff has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.214  There are two primary obstacles in applying this 
tort.  First, if the image is taken in a public arena, courts have held that in-
trusion upon seclusion does not apply.215  Second, even if the photograph 
was not taken in a public forum, by posting the image on Facebook, the 
plaintiff is placing the photograph in an arena that is not secluded.216  How-
ever, there is an applicable exception.  An individual, even if in a public 
                                                            
208.  See id. 
209.  See id. 
210.  In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
211.  In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, supra note 82 (stating the bi-
ometric data collection “occurred without the knowledge or consent of Facebook users”). 
212.  See Macke, supra note 199 (stating Facebook sells its users’ information to market-
ing companies). 
213.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
214.  See generally id. § 652B cmts. a–b. 
215.  Id. § 652B cmt. c (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photo-
graph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion . . . .”)  
216.   See Data Use Policy, supra note 12 (explaining that Facebook is not a secluded are-
na because select information is made public and thus is available to “anyone, including people 
off of Facebook”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) (“The in-
vasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself.”).  
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arena, can allege intrusion upon seclusion if the information that is intruded 
upon is not available to “public gaze.”217 
The National Science and Technology Council’s report acknowledges 
that biometric data is sensitive and personal information,218 and arguably a 
private affair.  Though Facebook users post images that are taken in the 
public arena,219 a user’s biometric data is still private information because 
the data (for example, the exact measurement between a user’s eyes) is in-
formation that is not available to public gaze.220  Biometric data is thereby 
more than a mere image publicly posted on Facebook—it is a template of 
data and a breakdown of one’s face.221  Most persons may feel like the ex-
act nature of their facial shape—the exact measurements between their 
eyes, the width of their nose, the length of their jawbone—is private infor-
mation.222  Also, Facebook’s intrusion into the private affairs of its users 
was covert and intentional.223  Since the extraction of the data requires a 
complex methodology,224 it is unlikely the information was collected in er-
ror.  Therefore, users could legitimately claim that Facebook has substan-
tially intruded upon its users’ private affairs by secretively collecting the 
facial template of each of its users. 
Finally, there is not a clear set of directions on Facebook regarding 
how to opt out of the tag suggestion tool and have Facebook delete stored 
                                                            
217.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place, 
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff . . . that are not exhibited to the public 
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”). 
218.  See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 8.  
219.  See Chris Cox, Making it Easier to Share with Who You Want, FACEBOOK BLOG 
(Aug. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150251867797131 (sug-
gesting Facebook users upload photographs taken in public locations). 
220.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public place, 
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff . . . that are not exhibited to the public 
gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”); see 
also Bosnor & Johnson, supra note 34 (explaining that facial recognition systems collect bio-
metric data and then measure the distances between 80 reference points on the face by creating 
numerical codes). 
221.  VeriLook Algorithm Features and Capabilities, NEUROTECHNOLOGY, http://www. 
neurotechnology.com/verilook-technology.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining how facial 
recognition technology creates a template of the face and stores the information in a database). 
222.  See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 34 (discussing the facial features facial recogni-
tion software measures). 
223.  See In re Facebook and the Facial Identification of Users, supra note 85 (stating 
Facebook intentionally collected the biometric data, and the collection was “without the knowl-
edge or consent of Facebook users”). 
224.  Nathan Chandler, How Facebook Tags Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS (July 12, 2011), 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/tips/facebook-photo-tags2.htm (discussing how fa-
cial recognition involves complex algorithms and programming). 
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biometric data.  As a result, users are likely required to navigate their way 
through a multi-layered process and to refer to an instruction guide from an 
outside source.225  Consequently, it is difficult for users to prevent and stop 
the intrusion. 
IV.  THE HURDLES IN SUING FACEBOOK 
Two primary issues plague private lawsuits against Facebook and 
can deter individuals from pursuing litigation against Facebook.  First, in 
order to have standing226 there must be an injury-in-fact.227  However, this 
element is hard to prove because of the difficultly in ascertaining the com-
pensable injury suffered by the collection, possession, and use of the bio-
metric data.228  Second, when users upload their photographs to Facebook, 
they consent to Facebook’s privacy policy.229  However, this procured 
consent is unconscionable.230 
In light of these difficulties, courts should place an intrinsic value on 
privacy, thereby creating a compensable injury-in-fact and allowing indi-
viduals to bring claims against companies, such as Facebook, that violate 
privacy rights. 
A.  The Difficulty of Defining Damages 
To assert a claim against Facebook, the harm that results in the collec-
tion, possession, and use of the biometric data must be quantifiable because 
                                                            
225.  Erica Ho, How to Make Facebook Stop Recognizing Your Face in Photos, TIME 
TECHLAND (June 8, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://techland.time.com/2011/06/08/how-to-make-
facebook-stop-recognizing-your-face-in-photos/ (describing how it is confusing for users to 
navigate their way through the opt out process); see also Data Protection Issues with Facebook’s 
Facial Recognition Function, DR. WIDMER & PARTNERS, ATT’YS LAW (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.widmerpartners-lawyers.ch/en/news/news/newsitems/Data+protection+issues+with+ 
Facebook%E2%80%99s+new+facial+recognition+function.htm (“[T]he opt-out feature is both 
difficult for users to find on the website and difficult to use.  [Further,] it is unclear whether users 
who have chosen to opt out of the feature actually have their biometric data deleted, or whether 
the tagging mechanism is merely blocked . . . .”). 
226.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (holding that to appear in court, a 
party must have standing to sue; the right to adjudicate their claim(s)). 
227.  U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
228.  See What’s the Harm?  Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, WILEY REIN 
LLP PRIVACY FOCUS (June 2002), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles& 
newsletter=4&id=3079 (stating that courts have had difficulty in finding the value of privacy and 
non-tangible items because of the difficulty in quantifying the damage).  As such, because bio-
metric data is non-tangible, it would be difficult for the court to assess the damage. 
229.  Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
230.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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federal and state courts can only adjudicate actual “cases and controver-
sies.”231  To prove standing, there must be an injury-in-fact, a casual con-
nection between the injury and the alleged conduct, and the injury must be 
susceptible to resolution through a favorable decision.232  An injury-in-fact 
must be “distinct and palpable,”233 meaning it must be inimitable, tangible, 
and not abstract.234  Courts also typically do not find standing in cases 
where the issues are of broad social impact.235  Similarly, to have standing 
in California, there must be an injury-in-fact; however, if the injury is not 
compensable by restitution, a court may still find standing exists if the inju-
ry was caused by an unfair business practice.236 
Facebook’s facial recognition tool is a recent advent and the totality 
of the injuries have yet to manifest;237 thus it is difficult to determine the 
damages that will result from Facebook’s invasion of privacy.  Unfortu-
nately, current privacy law does not consider the collection of personal in-
formation238 or the risk of damage239 enough to constitute an injury.  This 
sentiment has become a common theme, and courts frequently find that 
personal information, including information that is collected online and 
easily manipulated, is not intrinsically valuable.240  However, the majority 
of lawsuits that consumers have filed against companies collecting personal 
data have dealt with consumers’ email addresses, mailing addresses, and 
purchasing history.241  This information is personal but not as sensitive in 
                                                            
231.  See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (“Article III of the Constitution confines the federal 
courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”). 
232.  See id. at 750–51. 
233.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). 
234.  See id. at 508 (stating a plaintiff must allege “specific, concrete facts demonstrating 
that the challenged practices harm him, and that the plaintiff would personally benefit in a tangi-
ble way from the court’s intervention”). 
235.  See id. at 499 (holding that a litigant must assert an injury that is peculiar to himself 
or to a distinct group of which he is a part, rather than one “shared in substantially equal measure 
by all or a large class of citizens”).  
236.  See Allergan, Inc. v. Athena Cosmetics, Inc., 640 F.3d. 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
237.  See Singer, supra note 38 (discussing the potential harms that can be a result of 
Facebook’s facial recognition software). 
238.  See What’s the Harm?  Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, supra 
note 228. 
239.  See generally Aronson v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 767 A.2d 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
240.  See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding 
that a cardholder’s name and spending information have little intrinsic value); see also What’s the 
Harm?  Disputing Damages in Privacy Violation Cases, supra note 228. 
241.  See generally Powers v. Pottery Barn, Inc., 177 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1045–46 
(2009) (holding that e-mail addresses are not personal information as defined in the California 
Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, an Act that prohibits retailers from collecting personally identi-
fiable information).   
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nature as biometric data largely because it is information that is readily 
placed on the Internet and does not include unique, personal identifiers.242 
If injury is established, the court still needs to find that injury com-
pensable.243  For example, in the case Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 
the plaintiffs alleged that a hacker accessed their personal information from 
Old National Bancorp’s website, but did not allege identity theft.244  The 
Seventh Circuit court found the alleged injury, accessing personal infor-
mation, sufficient to confer standing, but did not find the injury compensa-
ble.245  Nevertheless, the court held that the “time spent . . . seeking to pre-
vent or undo the harm” from a data breach is a compensable injury.246 
Facebook’s privacy breach has not created a discernible, compensa-
ble injury.  Although it is difficult and time consuming to figure out how 
to have Facebook remove the facial recognition tool, it is not impossi-
ble.247  The difficulties do not rise to the level of causing a compensable 
injury since, as previously stated, there are several media outlets that have 
published instructional guides on how to remove one’s biometric data 
from Facebook.248 
In light of the difficulty in finding a compensable injury, courts need 
to consider placing a greater value on the biometric data and the protection 
of the data to prevent privacy intrusions.  Already courts have allowed non-
tangible claims such as economic advantage and family development to 
have an intrinsic interest.249  The list of non-tangible claims that have been 
granted an intrinsic interest must expand as technology advances and, con-
                                                            
242.  Compare NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 8, 21 (discussing how 
biometric data is “sensitive personal information” and how biometrics are “affected by the indi-
vidual’s unique genetic makeup”), with McIntyre, supra note 160 (explaining that e-mail address-
es do not expressly identify an individual because “[e]-mail addresses may be shared, for exam-
ple, by multiple people in one household (familyname@serviceprovider.com) or by multiple em-
ployees who sign in to a generic company account (info@company.com)”). 
243.  See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[A] compen-
sable injury proximately caused by the [defendant]” must be established to find the defendant in 
violation and establish damages (emphasis added)). 
244.  See id. at 631 (emphasis added). 
245.  See id. at 640; see also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (2010) 
(concluding, despite plaintiffs meeting the standing requirement, that they failed to allege an inju-
ry sufficient to state a claim under relevant state law). 
246.  See generally Kuhn v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 05-P-810, 2006 WL 3007981, at 
3 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 23, 2006). 
247.  Lee, supra note 89. 
248.  See id. 
249.  See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1915, 1931 (1986). 
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sequently, makes the collection of biometric data easier for private compa-
nies capable of developing facial recognition software.250 
B.  Facebook’s Privacy Policy Is Unconscionable and  
Negates User Consent 
A contract that arises out of unequal bargaining power is deemed to be 
unconscionable and unenforceable.251  To make this determination there must 
be procedural and substantive unconscionability, both of which are deter-
mined by examining the terms of the contract and the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction.252  For procedural unconscionability, there must be 
an indication of unequal bargaining power and the element of surprise; 
meaning the unconscionable clause is usually buried in fine print and legal-
ese.253  Substantive unconscionability is established when the terms are un-
reasonably favorable to one party; when the contract is “one-sided.”254 
Facebook’s data use policy (“user agreement”) is potentially proce-
durally unconscionable because it incorporates an element of surprise by 
not including information regarding Facebook’s biometric data collec-
tion.255  Facebook states that by creating an account and logging into one’s 
Facebook account, a user has agreed to its privacy policy.256  The disclo-
sure regarding this agreement is in fine print and notice of it only appears 
on a user’s initial login.257  After the first login, the disclosure no longer 
appears on the main login screen; however, the privacy policy can still be 
                                                            
250.  See id. (stating that the Court has found an intrinsic interest in non-tangible claims 
such as economic advantage, family development, the full power of the vote, not being forced to 
disclose religious contributions, and not being forced to go to public schools). 
251.  See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388 (1960) (stating differ-
ences in bargaining power can enable courts to find a contract unenforceable); see also Williams 
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“It has been held as a mat-
ter of common law that unconscionable contracts are not enforceable.”). 
252.  See generally Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
253.  See generally id. 
254.  See id. at 449 (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms 
might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.  But when a party of lit-
tle bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge 
of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, 
was ever given to all the terms.  In such a case the . . . court should consider whether the terms of 
the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”). 
255.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
256.  FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).  
257.  Id. 
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viewed by locating the link in the bottom right corner of the website.258  In 
pertinent part, the privacy policy states: 
  When you post things like photos or videos on Facebook, 
we may receive additional related data (or metadata259), such as 
the time, date, and place you took the photo or video. 
  We receive data from the computer, mobile phone or other 
device you use to access Facebook.  This may include your IP 
address, location, the type of browser you use, or the pages you 
visit.  . . . . 
 . . . . 
  We only provide data to our advertising partners or custom-
ers after we have removed your name or any other personally 
identifying information from it, or have combined it with other 
people’s data in a way that it is no longer associated with you.260 
The privacy policy does not disclose that Facebook collects and stores bio-
metric data, thus creating an element of surprise.261 
Finding information on Facebook’s biometric data collection can 
prove to be a difficult task.262  In the “About” section, located at the bottom 
right corner on Facebook’s homepage, there is a link to Resources, which 
in turn links to “Bloggers at Facebook.”263  There, the search function 
yields only one result when the term “biometrics” is searched.264  While the 
result does suggest biometric data is private and needs to be protected, the 
result does not state, or even allude to, Facebook’s collection of biometric 
                                                            
258.  Id. 
259.  While the data use policy does state that it extracts metadata, this data is distinguish-
able from biometric data.  Compare Woodward, Horn, Gatune & Thomas, supra note 33 (stating 
biometric data is “a “measurable . . . distinctive physical characteristic or personal trait that can be 
used to identify an individual”), with Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc., 
248 F.R.D. 556, 557 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining metadata as information regarding “when the doc-
ument was created [and] when it was modified . . . .”). 
260.  See Data Use Policy, supra note 12. 
261.  See id. 
262.  See FACEBOOK, supra note 256. 
263.  FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69. 
264.  Id.; Tim Sparapani, Viewpoints on Privacy for the Digital Age, FACEBOOK BLOG 
(Jan. 28, 2010, 10:41 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?blog_id=company&blogger= 
636748905. 
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data and Facebook’s facial recognition tool.265  Additionally, when search-
ing for information regarding “facial recognition,” the search yields seven 
results, only one of which specifically relates to Facebook’s use of facial 
recognition technology.266  Again, this result does not mention that bio-
metric data is collected in conjunction with the facial recognition tool.  It is 
likely only a technologically savvy user would know facial recognition 
software requires the collection of biometric data.267  The blog entry refer-
encing the tag suggestions provides a link to a separate page called the 
“Help Center.”268  Only when searching through the Help Center with the 
phrase “photo comparison” does information alluding to biometric data col-
lection finally emerge:  “When you’re tagged in a photo, we associate the 
tags with your account, compare what these tagged photos have in common 
and store a summary of this comparison.”269  As demonstrated, information 
regarding the mechanics of the tag suggestions tool is spread among several 
pages and requires a user to perform keyword searches.  Thus, it is con-
ceivable that the user agreement is buried within the Facebook website, fur-
ther contributing to the procedural unconscionability of the user agreement. 
The substantive element is slightly more difficult to establish because 
the contract concerning the biometric data is not entirely one-sided.270  On 
one hand, Facebook users can network more efficiently with access to the 
feature,271 which is the primary objective of Facebook.272  On the other hand, 
                                                            
265.  Sparapani, supra note 264 (quoting Ann Cavoukian, the “Information and Privacy 
Commissioner for Ontario, Canada,” as stating, “[t]he growth of privacy-invasive technologies 
such as biometrics . . . has intensified the need to sharpen our focus on privacy and the best meth-
ods to protect it.”). 
266.  Mitchell I, supra note 1. 
267.  See Chandler, supra note 224 (discussing how facial recognition involves complex 
algorithms and programming that require a computer programmer’s skill level). 
268.  See Mitchell I, supra note 1; see also FACEBOOK BLOG, supra note 69. 
269.  Help Center, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/search/?q=photo+ 
comparison (last visited Apr. 16, 2012); What Information Does Facebook Use to Tell that a Pho-
to Looks Like Me and to Suggest that Friends Tag Me?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook. 
com/help/?faq=218540514842030#What-information-does-Facebook-use-to-tell-that-a-photo-
looks-like-me-and-to-suggest-that-friends-tag-me? (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
270.  See Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowl-
edge of its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain.  But 
when a party of little bargaining power . . . signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little 
or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifesta-
tion of his consent, was ever given to all the terms.  In such a case the . . . court should consider 
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”). 
271.  See Geuss, supra note 82 (“Facial recognition is a cool technology that Facebook is 
using to add more convenience to the act of tagging people in photos.  The technology may in-
deed create more connections between friends . . . .”). 
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Facebook’s financial gains from the feature outweigh any efficiency given to 
the users because Facebook can make a profit from each piece of information 
Facebook stores regarding its users.273  Further evidencing the one-sided na-
ture of the user agreement, Facebook misleads users as to the terms of the 
agreement.274  As such, the contract with regard to Facebook’s acquisition of 
biometric data is unconscionable and its terms should be unenforceable. 
V.  SUGGESTIONS 
Biometric data is personally identifiable information that the govern-
ment has recognized to be highly sensitive,275 therefore needing greater le-
gal protections.276  The cry for assistance in creating protections does not 
only come from individuals concerned about their privacy, but also from 
the Biometrics industry.277  Industry leaders have asked for guidelines to 
ensure the privacy of individuals who have had their biometric data collect-
ed without their consent—a situation similar to Facebook’s method of bio-
metric data collection.278  For the guidelines to be most effective, they need 
to be technology-based.279 
Nevertheless, the United States has not created a uniform standard to 
protect privacy rights by preventing companies such as Facebook from col-
                                                            
272.  Info, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook#!/facebook?sk=info (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2012) (“Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and make the world 
more open and connected.”). 
273.  See Macke, supra note 199; see also Somini Sengupta & Evelyn M. Rusli, Person-
al Data’s Value?  Facebook is Set to Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at A1, A15.  (“Every 
time a person shares a link, listens to a song, clicks on one of Facebook’s ubiquitous ‘like’ but-
tons, or changes a relationship status to ‘engaged,’ a morsel of data is added to Facebook’s vast 
library.  It is a siren to advertisers hoping to leverage that information to match their ads with 
the right audience.”). 
274.  Julia Angwin, Shayndi Raice & Spencer E. Ante, Facebook Retreats on Privacy, 
WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020422460457703 
0383745515166.html (discussing a settlement reached between the U.S. government and Face-
book over allegations Facebook misled users about its use of user information). 
275.  See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 21. 
276.  See id. at 14 (discussing how because biometric data is sensitive information, there 
should be a system implemented to ensure the data remains private and does not infringe on indi-
vidual rights).   
277.  David George, Face Recognition May Enhance Airport Security, CNN (Sept. 28, 
2001), http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-28/us/rec.airport.facial.screening_1_biometric-technology-
face-recognitionvisionics?_s=PM:US. 
278.  See id. (“The [International Biomteric Industry Association] says there need to be 
rules to protect the privacy of people whose faces are scanned in public places” such as airports, 
where the individual is unaware his or her data is being collected). 
279.  See id. (“The harsh new realities [of biometrics] require vigorous, technology-based 
responses . . . .”). 
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lecting the data without user consent.280  Similarly, Congress failed to require 
companies to ensure that proper measures have been taken to secure the data 
once it has been collected.281  This section provides suggestions on how the 
United States should protect individuals’ biometric data, particularly online.  
Conveniently, the United States can look to Europe for guidelines.282  In ad-
dition, the United States Government should implement legislation to protect 
biometric data similar to the legislation enacted to protect medical infor-
mation.283  Finally, if Congress does not enact legislation heightening the 
protection of biometric data, the Federal Trade Commission should both con-
tinue to intervene when companies place the privacy of their consumers at 
risk and actively enforce settlements reached.284 
                                                            
280.  See generally Helen Pidd, Facebook Facial Recognition Software Violates Privacy 
Laws, Says Germany, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/aug/ 
03/facebook-facial-recognition-privacy-germany (“The tool runs all photos uploaded to the social 
networking site through a [program] . . . .  [T]hough users can opt out of the automatic tagging, 
Facebook can still gather and store (indefinitely) all photos added to the site.” (emphasis added)). 
281.  In November of 2011, the Federal Trade Commission reached a settlement with 
Facebook that requires Facebook to gain users’ affirmative consent before disclosing “nonpublic 
user information” and that prevents Facebook from misleading users about the information that is 
being collected.  See Agreement Containing Consent Order at 4, In re Facebook, Inc. (No. 092-
3183), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf.  The settlement 
also requires Facebook to create a privacy program that addresses privacy risks of new products.  
Id. at 5.  Notably, the settlement does not create any guidelines and leaves the responsibility of 
creating a comprehensive privacy scheme to Facebook.  See generally id. 
282.  See supra Part V.A. 
283.  See id. 
284.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) recently developed the Privacy and Identity 
Protection division to assist in enforcing Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or de-
ceptive acts.  See Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
bcppip.shtm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (explaining the purpose of the Division of Privacy and 
Identity Protection).  The FTC found Facebook in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, which 
led to the settlement between the FTC and Facebook.  See Press Release, Facebook Settles FTC 
Charges that It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises, FTC (Nov. 11, 2011), 
available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/11/privacysettlement.shtm (“The social networking service 
Facebook has agreed to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that it deceived consum-
ers . . . .”).  As part of the settlement, the FTC will monitor Facebook to ensure compliance with 
the order.  See id.  While the settlement does showcase the FTC’s move to enforce privacy protec-
tions, there are nevertheless potential issues with the private settlements and the ability of the 
FTC to enforce the orders.  See Jeff Roberts, Facebook Settlement Shows FTC Getting New Trac-
tion with Privacy Enforcement, PAIDCONTENT (Nov. 11, 2011), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-
facebook-settlement-shows-ftc-getting-new-traction-with-privacy-enforce/ (“The settlement[] . . . 
confirm[s] that . . . the FTC’s Consumer Bureau called ‘Privacy and Identity Protection’ aspires 
to make a name for itself in online privacy issues.”); Tim Bukher, The Facebook FTC Settlement 
Will Just Give Users a False Sense of Security, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-12-01/tech/30462143_1_facebook-privacy-pract (“The 
problem is that this latest FTC settlement may . . . get users to drop their guards with a false sense 
that the FTC has covered all the bases.”).  For example, if a company breaches an FTC settle-
ment, penalties can be imposed, but rarely are imposed.  See  Roberts, supra (“Technically, a 
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A.  Borrowing the Privacy Model from Europe 
After Facebook disclosed its tags suggestions, European privacy regu-
lators immediately began inquiring about Facebook’s facial recognition 
technology.285  Namely, Germany alleged that Facebook is in violation of 
both European and German privacy laws because the biometric database 
has been compiled without user consent.286  Johannes Caspar, the Data Pro-
tection Supervisor in Hamburg, suggested there would be grave results if 
the data Facebook has stored were to fall into the wrong hands.287  The 
United Kingdom and Ireland have taken cue and are currently investigating 
the feature.288 
European countries were able to allege privacy violations because 
these countries enacted a more stringent and sweeping privacy protection 
program than the United States.289  The significant difference in the legal 
policies was noted at the European Parliament’s Privacy Platform when 
Facebook’s spokesperson acknowledged that Facebook honors the “transat-
lantic agreement to ensure European data remains safe and secure by Euro-
pean standards while in the United States.”290  The statement implies the 
                                                            
company that breaches the terms of an FTC settlement is liable for major civil penalties.  In reali-
ty, though, such penalties are rarely imposed.”).  Other issues with the FTC settlement include, 
but are not limited to, the following:  (1) Facebook is not required to admit wrongdoing; (2) with-
out a legal proceedings, the privacy violations are not placed in the public spotlight; and (3) the 
settlement applies only to Facebook; thus, there is an not as widespread an impact in the social 
media arena.  See id. (discussing the shortfalls of the FTC settlement). 
285.  Ryan Singel, Singel-Minded:  Anatomy of a Backlash, or How Facebook Got an ‘F’ 
for Facial Recognition, WIRED EPICENTER (June 9, 2011), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/ 
06/anatomy-of-backlash/. 
286.  See Pidd, supra note 280. 
287.  See id. 
288.  See Steven Musil, Facebook Faces Lawsuit Over Facial-Recognition Feature, 
CNET NEWS (Nov. 10, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57322815-93/facebook-faces-
lawsuit-over-facial-recognition-feature/?part=rss&subj=latest-news&tag=title. 
289.  Matthew Taylor, Superinjunctions, Injunctions and Privacy Laws Around the World, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/apr/26/superinjunctions-
injunctions-privacy-laws; see also Byron Acohido, Critics Say Privacy Hearing Skewed Against 
Consumers, USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
technologylive/post/2011/09/critics-say-privacy-hearing-skewed-against-consumers/1 (noting 
California Representative Mary Bono Mack held a public hearing in September of 2011 titled 
“Internet Privacy:  The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation.”  When it was announced there 
would not be a European witness to support the approach to privacy taken in the U.S., one priva-
cy advocate explained, “this hearing could throw cold water on efforts to enact strong privacy 
protections, such as those that exist in Europe, in the United States.”). 
290.  Zack Whittaker, Facebook Rebuked by EU Privacy Platform; Patriot Act a “Dis-
traction”?, ZDNET (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/facebook-rebuked-by-eu-
privacy-platform-patriot-act-a-distraction/57482 (emphasis added). 
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standards between the two continents are different, and that the European 
standards are stricter than those of the United States. 
Paul Schwartz, a law professor at the University of California, Berke-
ley, and a director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, stated:  
“In Europe, there is a comprehensive privacy law in each nation which re-
quires that online privacy be protected.  In the U.S., we regulate sector by 
sector, and there are notable gaps in protection.”291 
Schwartz is likely referring to the 1995 Directive Authorized (“1995 
Directive”) by the European Union (“EU”),292 which was further embellished 
in 2000 (“2000 Directive”).293  The European model is beneficial because it 
creates a uniform law among EU members, who were required to adopt the 
Directives,294 and establishes clear requirements.295  As a result, the EU is 
less prone to gaps in privacy protections.296  Notably, the European Union 
Safe Harbor requires companies to give prior opt-in consent before collecting 
sensitive personal information.297  The United States government should con-
struct a scheme similar to the European model by creating uniform laws to 
help prevent inevitable future privacy violations.298 
                                                            
291.  John Moe, What Can We Learn From Europe About Online Privacy?, AM. PUB. 
MEDIA (Sept. 14, 2011), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/09/14/tech-report-
what-we-can-learn-from-europe-about-online-privacy/?refid=0. 
292.  See S. REP. NO. 107-240, at 5 (2002) (explaining the 1995 European Directive gov-
erns online and offline data collection). 
293.  See generally Council Directive 45/2001 (EC) 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (EC). 
294.  See S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 5 (discussing that as of 1998, when the 1995 Directive 
was adopted, each member state of the European Union was required to adopt a policy mirroring 
the 1995 Directive); see also Council Directive 45/2001, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1 (EC) (“This 
Regulation shall apply to the processing of personal data by [the European Community] and bod-
ies insofar as such processing is carried out in the exercise of activities all or part of which fall 
within the scope of Community law.”).  
295.  See S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 5–6 (explaining that the 1995 Directive requires compa-
nies “in both their online and offline practices, to provide:  (1) notice; (2) an opt-out with respect 
to non-sensitive commercial marketing of personal information; (3) an opt-in with respect to sen-
sitive personal information; (4) a right of access to personal information collected; and (5) reason-
able security protections for that information.”). 
296.  See Moe, supra note 291 (explaining Europe has a “comprehensive privacy law in 
each nation,” thus Europe is less prone to gaps in regulation, whereas the U.S. regulates sector by 
sector, which allows for inconsistencies); see also S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 6 (explaining that Eu-
rope had to create the European Union Safe Harbor in 2000, a set of less intrusive regulations that 
allow U.S. companies to comply with the Directive). 
297.  S. REP. NO. 107-240 at 6.  
298.  Id. (suggesting state legislatures have enacted inconsistent privacy laws and would 
prefer a more uniform standard). 
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B.  Applying the Same Protection for Medical Information to Biometrics 
Despite the surge of interest in protecting personally identifiable in-
formation, Congress has been grappling with how to create laws that en-
courage innovation in technology, while also ensuring that information col-
lection is “fair, transparent, and subject to law.”299  Congress’s struggle is 
evidenced in proposed legislation such as the Online Personal Privacy Act 
of 2002,300 the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002,301 and the Priva-
cy Act of 2005.302  However, those laws have not yet been enacted.303  For 
now, the legislature has focused on protecting medical information because 
health insurance companies and various businesses keep client health and 
medical information in electronic databases.304 
Although medical information is considered extremely private, so is 
facial recognition data, which can reveal unique characteristics about peo-
ple.305  Additionally, the subcommittee on Biometrics explained that with 
specialized training, some biometric models could potentially be used to 
detect medical information or drug use.306  Thus, the legislature should give 
biometric data the same protection as medical data. 
                                                            
299.  Id. 
300.  Online Personal Privacy Act, S. 2201, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002). 
301.  Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005). 
302.  See Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4678, 107th Cong. § 401 (2002). 
303.  See S. 2201; see also H.R. 1263. 
304.  Summary of the HIPPA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 1 
(2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html 
(explaining the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPPA”) was en-
acted to protect the electronic storage of health information and ensure a patient’s health informa-
tion is private).  The Department of Health and Human Services also developed the Standards for 
Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy Rule”), which “appl[ies] to 
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and to any health care provider who transmits health in-
formation in electronic form . . . .”  Id. at 2.  Overall, “[t]he Privacy Rule protects all ‘individually 
identifiable health information’ held or transmitted by a covered entity or its business associate, 
in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral.”  Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).  The gen-
eral principle of the Privacy Rule is to require covered entities to disclose and request only the 
minimum amount of protected health information.  Id. at 6.  Congress has since been vigilant in 
enforcing HIPPA and, consequently, protecting medical information.  See Rachel Grunberger, 
Senate Hearings Focus on Lack of HIPPA Enforcement, Final HITECH Rule, INSIDE PRIVACY 
(Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.insideprivacy.com/senate-hearings-focus-on-lack-of-hipaa- 
enforcement-final-hitech-rule/. 
305.  See NSTC Subcomm. on Biometrics, supra note 38, at 14. 
306.  Id. 
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C.  Federal Agencies Avoid the Hurdle of Defining Damages 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) protects consumers from un-
fair or deceptive business practices through investigation and enforcement 
actions.307  To pursue an enforcement action, the FTC must find a “reason 
to believe” that the law has been violated.308  The “reason to believe” 
standard to initiate proceedings is a less rigid standard than the standing re-
quirement of injury-in-fact.309  Accordingly, the FTC is better suited to 
tackle Facebook’s privacy violation, as the compensable-injury hurdle does 
not exist under the FTC.310 
However, this avenue might not be the most effective way to combat 
Facebook’s privacy intrusion.  In June 2011, Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (“EPIC”) filed its Complaint with the FTC; however, the FTC is un-
der no obligation to respond.311  In fact, after three months, the FTC’s indi-
rect response to the complaint was to host a workshop discussing the priva-
cy issues related to facial recognition technology.312  Thus, Facebook had 
the opportunity to continue to violate its users’ privacy rights for 90 days 
while awaiting the FTC workshop.313  In contrast, Facebook would have had 
21 days to respond to a complaint filed in federal court314 and 30 days to re-
spond in California,315 which could have allowed for a quicker remedy.  Af-
                                                            
307.  A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law En-
forcement Authority, supra note 20, at 3. 
308.  Id. at 2. 
309.  Compare A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and 
Law Enforcement Authority, supra note 20, at 2 (“[T]he Commission may initiate an enforcement 
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there is a violation of the law to begin an investigation). 
311.  See John E. Villafranco, Challenging a Competitor’s Advertising Claims, ANTI-
TRUST SOURCE (May 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_ 
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(Sept. 9, 2011), http://ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/facialrec.shtm. 
313.  Id. 
314.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(i). 
315.  CAL. CIV. PROC. § 438(h)(2) (West 2011). 
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ter five months, the FTC finally responded to EPIC’s complaint by reaching 
a settlement with Facebook in November 2011.316 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Facebook violated the privacy rights of its users when it collected their 
biometric data without consent.  Even though users can possibly establish 
Constitutional violations and potentially establish privacy tort violations, the 
lack of value afforded to keeping biometric data private makes it very diffi-
cult to establish damages.317  While the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
remains a viable source to file a complaint,318 it may not be the most suc-
cessful means because the FTC has the ability to choose which complaints 
to pursue.319  Since it is difficult for private parties to protect their personal 
information through the courts, Congress should step in and either (1) create 
a uniform privacy model similar to Europe’s, or (2) create legislation that 
protects biometric data similar to the legislation that has been created to pro-
tect health care information.320  If Congress were to apply greater protec-
tions to biometric data, thereby heightening privacy protections of personal-
ized information, courts would be able to follow suit. 
                                                            
316.  See Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep 
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317.  See supra Part IV.A.  
318.  See supra Part V.C.  
319.  See Villafranco, supra note 311 (explaining that the FTC uses its own discretion to 
determine which complaints it will pursue). 
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